PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ACTIONS.

The question as to the nature of an action founded on
the alleged duty of a landlord to see that the premises are
Contract or in repair becomes of special importance in its
Tort
relation to the Statute of Limitations. Thus in
Altsheler v. Conrad, 82 S. W. 257, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky decides that a petition alleging that defendant
agreed to fix the premises plaintiffs leased of him, but did
not do so, and that thereafter plaintiffs' employee was injured by the defect in the premises, and recovered judgment
of them in a certain amount, which they seek to recover of
defendant, is not founded on the personal injuries to the
employee, to which the one-year Statute of Limitations applies, but on the breach of contract, to which the five-year
statute applies.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

In Mass v. Burdetzke, IOI N. W. 182, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota decides that a person who takes possession of land in the erroneous belief that it is
Intent
public land, with the intention of holding and
claiming it under the federal homestead law, may -acquire
title thereto by adverse possession as against the true owner.
Compare Altschul v. O'Neill, 35 Or. 202.
- In Murphy v. Rony, 82 S. W. 396, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky decides that admissions inconsistent with
ownership made by one in possession of land
Admissions
after acquiring title by adverse possession do
not constitute an estoppel, but may be considered on the
issue of whether the possession was in fact adverse.
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ASSAULT.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in State
v. Thornton, 48 S. E. 6o2, that when the correction adminAuthority of istered by a school-teacher is not in itself imSchoolmoderate, and therefore beyond the authority
Teacher
of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend entirely on the quo animo with which it is administered.
BANKRUPTCY.

An important decision in the United States Supreme
Court interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is found in
Crawford v. Burke, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, where
Provable
Debts:
it is decided that only such debts created by the
Discharge
fraud of a bankrupt as were so created while he
was acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity are excepted from the operation of a discharge in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, Sec. 17, Subd. 4, since to hold that the language of this subdivision, making an exception in favor
of debts "created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer, or in any
fiduciary capacity," includes all debts fraudulently contracted, would render meaningless the exception in Subd. 2
in favor of such claims for fraud as have been reduced to
judgment.
The United States District Court (S. D. New York)
decides In re D. H. McBride & Co., 132 Fed. 285, that a
contract between author and publisher for the
Assets of
Estate;
copyrighting, publication, and sale by the latter
Copyright
of a series of books salable only in Catholic
school, and convents, and the payment of a royalty thereon
to the author, is a personal engagement, although the publisher may be a corporation; and where it expressly provides that it shall not be transferred without the author's
consent, and that, on a failure to carry out its provisions
the copyrights shall revert to the author, such copyrights
cannot be sold by a trustee in bankruptcy as an asset of the
publisher's estate against the objection of the author, who
is entitled, on petition therefor, to have them assigned by
the trustee in accordance with the contract.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

The difficulty of defining precisely a non-legal term is
appearing in-the decisions of the courts with regard to the
Manufactr- word "manufacturing" as used in the BankThus In re Troy Steam
ingCorpora- ruptcy Act of 1898.
tiols
Laundering Co., 132 Fed. 266, it is decided by
the United States District Court (N. D. New York) that
a corporation conducting a laundry, the largest part of its
business being the washing, starching, ironing, and polishing of collars, cuffs, etc., for manufacturers, before they are
put on the market, is engaged principally in manufacturing,
and is subject to proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy.
See note to Mattoon Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 42 C.
C. A. 4.
BILLS AND

NOTES.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides in Cotton v.
John Deere Plow Co., 78 Pac. 321, that a promissory note
Negotiability

which contains the following stipulation in rela-

tion to attorney's fees, to wit: "It is stipulated
by the parties to this note, that in event the same is collected by an attorney, or by any proceedings at law, an
attorney's fee consisting of ten dollars and ten per cent.
of the amount so collected shall be paid by the makers hereof
to the holder of the same," destroys the negotiable character of the instrument, and thereby makes it non-negotiable, and the note is therefore subject in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser for value to all the legal defences which
might be interposed against the note in the hands of the
original payee. Compare Adams v. Leaman, 23 Pac. 53,
7 L. R. A. 224.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey decides in Murphy v.
North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 58 Atl. ioi8, that although it
Boarding
cannot be held, as a matter of law, that a perMoving Car son who attempts to board a trolley-car while it
is in motion is negligent, yet, when the fact that the car
is in motion is the sole producing cause of the injury sued
for, the risk of its occurrence is one which the person
making the attempt must be held to have assumed.
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CARRIERS (Continued).

An interesting decision in reference to the extent to
which a carrier must protect a passenger from injury from
Protection of his fellow travellers occurs in Grogan v. BrookPassenger

lyn Heights R. Co., 89 N. Y. Supp.

1O27,

where it is decided by the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second Department) that in an action
against a carrier for injuries to a passenger, where it appeared that defendant exercised complete control over the
platform from which a passenger entered its car through
a window thereof, thereby inflicting injuries on plaintiff by
kicking him in the face, when no reason appeaied why the
defendant could not have compelled its passengers, who had
congregated on the platform with the purpose of taking
passage on the train in which plaintiff sat, to enter the cars
through the doors, the question of defendant's negligence
was for the jury.
The cases have not reached very satisfactory conclusions
upon the question of to what extent a carrier may be relieved of liability for an act of the shipper in
Responsibil- loading cars with his own goods.
It has
Ity for Goods
of Consignee several times been pointed out- that this is a
duty which the carrier itself should perform
and not entrust to a shipper, as knowledge of the care
required in loading cars will frequently not be possessed
by such shipper. However, the Supreme Court of Michigan,
dealing with an analogous question, decides in Edward
Frohlich Glass Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., IOI N. W. 223,
that where under an agreement between defendant railroad
company and a consignor the latter was authorized to select
cars for the transportation of its merchandise, and it selected
a car which had been delivered to it loaded with sand for
the shipment of a consignment of glass to plaintiff, and
damage resulted by reason of the unsuitableness' of the
car, the railroad company was not liable to the consignee
for negligently furnishing an unsuitable car, since as against
the railroad company the consignee was bound by the
consignor's selection under such agreement. Compare Pratt
v. Ogdensburg, 1O2 Mass. 557.

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The United States Supreme Court decides in Dobbins v.
Los Angeles, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18, that an arbitrary interDueProcess
ference with property rights protected by the
of Law
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which cannot be justified as an exercise of the
police power, results from the narrowing by municipal
ordinance of the limits within which gasworks may be
erected and maintained, so as to include within the prohibited territory property purchased for that purpose within
the district wherein the erection of such works was then
permitted, and on which such erection was then proceeding
in compliance with an existing ordinance and a permit of
the Board of Fire Commissioners, where such change was
not demanded by the public welfare, and seems rather to have
been actuated by a purpose to perpetuate a monopoly enjoyed by a gas company whose works were still within the
privileged district.
In City of Mt. Vernon v. Kenlon, 89 N. Y. Supp. 817,
the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second
Department) holds that the constitutionality of
toEstoppel
Question
Constitution. a law requiring the bond of an officer to be a
ality
lien on the real estate of the officer and his
sureties cannot be attacked by persons voluntarily executing
such bond. Compare Village of Olean v. King, 116 N. Y.
355.

CONTEMPT.

It is held by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Lorick & Lowrance v. Motley, 48 S. E. 614, that on disobedience of an order of court by trespassing

on lands adjudged to belong to another, the
trespasser may be required by the court to pay damages
suffered by reason of the trespass in contempt proceedings
or suffer imprisonment. Compare ER parte Thurmond,
I Baily, 6o8.
en
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CORPORATIONS.

In Boyce v. Augusta Camp, No. 7429, M. W. A., 78
Pac. 322, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides that
the words "a corporation," appearing in the
Pleading:
Corporate
title of a case after the name of a plaintiff, are
Existence
descriptive of the plaintiff, and cannot be construed to be an allegation of incorporation.
Leader Printing Co. v. Lowry, 59 Pac. 242.

Compare

An interesting decision in regard to the right to petition
for observance of the Sunday laws appears In re New
York Sabbath Committee, 89 N. Y. Supp. 992.
Powers
In that case the New York Sabbath Committee,

"a domestic corporation, duly organized" under the laws
of the state, applied under the New York charter to revoke
the license issued to respondent for a theatre in New York.
It was not shown in the application that the right to apply
for such revocation was within the corporate powers of the
petitioner. Under these facts the New York Supreme
Court (Special Term, New York County) holds that the
motion would be denied. Compare with this case Ancient
City Sportsman's Club v. Miller, 7 Lans. 412.
In Lyon v. James, 90 N. Y. Supp. 28, it appeared that a
pamphlet falsely stating the financial condition of a corLiability of
Directors to
Stockholders

poration was issued and distributed in the name

and under the sanction of defendants, the directors, whereby plaintiff was induced to become
and remain a stockholder, to her financial injury; but of
defendants only X, the active manager, knew of the falsity
of the representations, and the others did not make them
recklessly, not caring whether they were true or not, but
they merely relied on the fidelity and truthfulness of X,
and neglected their duty, in the proper discharge of which
they would have learned the truth. Under these facts the
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second
Department) holds that relief by way of compelling the
directors to take plaintiff's place as a stockholder, returning
to her her entire investment, could be had only against X,
actual and intentional fraud being necessary therefor; and
that the others were merely liable, on account of their
neglect of duty, for whatever losses plaintiff sustained
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thereby. With this case compare Kountze v. Kennedy, 147
N. Y. 124, 29 L. R. A. 360.
DAMAGES.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Rapid
Transit Ry. Co. v. Smith, 82 S. W. 788, that where an
t accident occurred in June, which caused plainRemoteness

tiff's wife to miscarry the following day, a

second miscarriage the following November, resulting from
the same injury, is not too remote for a recovery in the
same action.
DEEDS.

In Bosea v. Lent, 90 N. Y. Supp. 41, the New York

Supreme Court (Trial Term, Schenectady County) holds
that where a husband executed a deed of

property to his wife, and placed it in escrow
to be delivered to the grantee if the grantor got drunk
again, there was no consideration for the deed; and where
at the time of his death it had not been delivered, he was
the owner of the property though he had been drunk. See
also Crain v. Wright, .36 Hun. 74, and Hamer v. Sidway,
124 N. Y. 538.
Consideration

DIVORCE.

In Rogers v. Rogers, 58 Atl. 822, the Court of Chancery
of New Jersey decides that sexual intercourse by husband
Adultery:
and wife after he has knowledge and means of
Condonation .proving her, adultery is condonation, and that
real forgiveness is not necessary. Compare Todd v: Todd,
37 AtI. 766.
In Cochran v. Cochran, 1O N. W. 179, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota decides that condoned cruelty will be
revived by subsequent misconduct of the guilty
Cruelty
party of such a nature as to create a reasonable
apprehension that the cruelty will be repeated, even if such
misconduct be not in itself sufficient to warrant a divorce.
The application of an analogous rule to divorce granted
on the ground of adultery is well settled, and it is natural
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to find it applied where the divorce is granted on the ground
of cruelty.

EMBEZZLEMENT.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas decides in Wilson v. State, 82 S. W. 651, that where an employer sends
an employee to get some medicines, intrusting
Balftent:
a horse to him to ride for such purpose, there
What
Constitutes is a bailment of the horse, so as to make the
employee on conversion of it guilty of embezzlement. This
case is interesting in view of the important line of cases
distinguishing between a transfer of the possession of prop-.
erty and a transfer merely of its custody, when it is necessary to distinguish between embezzlement and larceny.

FEDERAL COURTS.

Since the passage of the Act of Congress of August 13,
1894, c. 280 (U. S. Comp. St. 19O1, page 2523), a numJurisdiction

ber of cases have arisen construing it and there
seems some doubt under it as to the jurisdiction

of federal courts. A new decision dealing with this matter
is the case of United States v. Churchyard, 132 Fed. 82,
where it is held that under this act requiring contractors for
government work to give bonds conditioned, first, for the
performance of the contract, and second, for the prompt
payment of all persons supplying labor or materials in the
prosecution of the work, and authorizing such persons in
case of non-payment "to bring suit in the name of the
United States for his or their use and benefit against said
contractor and sureties," such a suit is one in which the
United States is plaintiff within the meaning of Section i
of the Judiciary Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, and of
which a federal court has jurisdiction regardless of the
citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy.
With this decision should be compared United States v.
Henderlong, 1O2 Fed. 2, and United States v. Sheridan,
119 Fed. 236.
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GAMING.

Playing pool under an agreement that the one losing
shall pay for the table is betting within the statute prohibiting the keeping and exhibiting of a gaming
What
Constitutes
table for the purpose of gaming: Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas in Mayo v. State, 82 S. W. 515.

GOVERNMENT LANDS.

It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) in United States v. Detroit Timber
and Lumber Co., 131 Fed. 668, that the title
BonaPide
Purchaser
of a bona fide purchaser of lands subsequent to
the issue of the patents is superior to the equitable claim of
the United States to avoid the patents and the title under
them for fraud or error in the issue of the former. There
is the further holding that purchasers in good faith, without notice, for value, of the equitable title evidenced by
receivers' final receipts upon which patents subsequently
issue, have a complete defence of a bona fide purchase unassailable by a suit of the United States to avoid the patents
and the titles under them for fraud, perjury, or error in
the procurement of the former. Compare Guaranty Savings
Bank v. Bladow, 176 U. S. 448, 453.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

In Powell v. Benthall, 48 S. E. 598, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina decides that an action to recover damages for harboring plaintiff's wife after defendHarboring
ants were notified by the plaintiff not to do so
1arried
cannot be predicated of the act of a sister and
Women
brother-in-law of the plaintiff's wife in good faith harboring her, without having actively procured the separation or
counselling and advising its continuance. And it is further
held that in an action to recover damages for harboring
plaintiff's wife after defendants were notified by plaintiff
not to do so, the relation of the defendants to plaintiff's
wife is relevant and material on the question of motive.
Compare Turner v. Estes, 3 Mass. 317.
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In Hubbard v. Hubbard, 58 Atl. 969, the Supreme Court
of Vermont decides that since a husband has a freehold
Conveyance
estate in the land of his wife, where such land is
by Wife
not held by her for her sole and separate use,
an act authorizing the Court of Chancery "in its discretion" on the wife's petition to convey her real estate by
separate deed is unconstitutional, as depriving the husband
of his property without due process of law. Compare In re
Mary Ann Alexander, 53 N. J. 96.
ILLEGITIMACY.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Hall v. Hall,
82 S. W. 300, that a statute providing that if a man, having
had a child by a woman, shall afterwards marry
Statutes
her, such child or its descendants, if recognized
by him before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate,
does not apply to a case where the father was the husband
of another woman when the child was begotten. The fact
that similar statutes exist in almost all the states makes this
case of more than local interest.
INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut decides in
Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 58 Atl. 963,
Presumption that in an action on a life policy the presumpof Truthful-

ness of Repre-

sentatioas

tion that the declarations of deceased in the
application are true, while sufficient to make a
prima facie case for plaintiff on the introduc-

tion of the policy, is not entitled to be considered as having
probative force, requiring such presumption to be weighed
as evidence in the final determination of the issue of fact as
to whether the representations are true. Compare Barber's
Appeal, 63 Conn. 973, 22 L. R. A. 90.
The similarity in their main outlines of the various policies of life insurance makes of general interest the decisions
Construction of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Childress
of Policy
v. Fraternal Union of America, 82 S. W. 832.
It is there decided that a clause in an insurance policy
making the same incontestable after the expiration of two
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years, except as to agreements, representations, and warranties in relation to age, occupation, and use of alcohol,
and a clause reducing the indemnity in case of suicide to
one-third of the amount otherwise due, are separate and
independent, and in no wise affect each other; and the
beneficiary cannot recover more than one-third the policy
in case of suicide, although death occurs after the expiration
of two years and the policy has become incontestable.
MARRIED

WOMEN.

With one judge dissenting, it is decided by the Supreme
Court of South Carolina in Piersonv. Green, 48 S. E. 624,
that where a wife executed a mortgage to raise
Mortgages
money to pay her husband's debts and to com-

promise a criminal prosecution against him, and the mortgagee assisted in such compromise, the mortgage is valid
as to the sum used in payment of the debts, but invalid as
to the amount used in compromising the prosecution. See
Wallace v. Lark, 12 S. C. 578.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee decides in Chattanooga
Electric Ry. Co. v. Moore, 82 S. W. 478, that a street railNegligence; road company is not chargeable with negligence
Street Rail- in permitting telephone poles to be erected on
way Company land not owned or controlled by it so near the
track as to be dangerous to employees operating cars. See
also Lucas v. St. Louis Railway Company, 73 S. W. 589,
61 L. R. A. 452.
A decision of importance to telephone and telegraph companies is found in Britton v. Central Union Telephone Co.,
141 Fed. 844, where the court holds that where
Telephone
Poles
a telephone lineman was injured by the falling
of a defective pole from which he was removing the wires
prior to the demolition of the pole, such pole was an appliance only, and not a place to work which plaintiff's employer
was required to make safe for him to work on. Compare
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Chambers v. American Tin Plate Co., 129 Fed. 561, and
Maxfield v. Graveson, 131 Fed. 841, two recent cases bearing upon the same general matters.
MORTGAGES.

It is decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) in Booker v. Crocker, 132 Fed. 7,
Co-Bondthat one of several holders of bonds secured
holders
by a common mortgage, who purchases superior
liens upon or titles to the mortgaged property, takes them in
trust for his co-bondholders upon condition that within a
reasonable time after they receive notice of his purchases
they contribute to him their proportionate shares of the
amounts he paid for them. A community of interest in a
common title or security involves a mutual obligation not
to impair it. See also Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wallace, 616.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Against the dissent of three judges, the Supreme Court

of Illinois decides in Cormack v. Marshall, 71 N. E. 1077,

that, since a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain
the custody of a child is in the nature of a
private suit, in which the public is not concerned, a judgment in such proceeding before a court or judge having
competent jurisdiction is a final order, and, when unappealed from, is res judicata as between the parties so long
as the same conditions exist as obtained at the time of the
hearing and order. The decision presents a very careful
and satisfactory review of the principles and decisions involved. Compare In re King, 66 Kans. 695.
Custody of

Child

The Supreme Court of Michigan in McCrady v. Pratt,
IOI N. W. 227, holds that in an action for boarding the
Necessaries: defendant's son, the burden was on the plainBurden of
tiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
Proof
that when the son came to her to board he was
authorized to procure board upon the father's credit, and
that the plaintiff boarded the son, relying solely upon such
credit.
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SETTLEMENT.

The question when a promise of immediate payment
which is broken may be considered sufficient evidence of
fraud to avoid an agreement made in consideraPromise of
tion thereof is considered by the Supreme JudiImmediate
cial Court of Massachusetts in Wood v. Sherer,
Payment
71 N. E. 947. It there appeared that plaintiffs and defendant made a settlement, upon which defendant agreed
to give plaintiffs a check for a certain amount immediately.
Neither party having a blank check, this was not done, but
for a number of days thereafter plaintiffs continued to
expect the check. Defendant made other promises to send
it, and only four days before an action by the plaintiffs
against defendant the former notified the latter that, unless
they received the check by a certain day, they would sue.
Under these facts it is decided that it could not be said as
a matter of law that the settlement was conditional upon
defendant's giving a check at the time, or that it was procured by a fraudulent promise by defendant to give a
check then.
TAXATION.

The difficult questions which arise in determining the
situs of personal property for the purposes of taxation give
Situs of
Promissory

rise to a valuable decision by the Supreme
Court of Indiana in Buck v. Beach, 71 N. E.

963. In that case the following facts appear:
A resident of New York for many years kept a large
amount of money loaned in Ohio, the notes being payable
there, and secured by mortgages on property there situated.
The loans were made, and the interest and principal collected, by a permanent agency in Ohio. By direction of the
owner, for a series of years certain of such notes and mortgages were kept by another agent of his in Indiana in an
office belonging to such owner. Such agent took the notes
and mortgages at once after they were given and recorded,
and kept them at all times, except that he sent them to the
Ohio agent to have payments made endorsed thereon, and
also each year a few days prior to April i, which was the
day fixed by law for assessment in Indiana, they being returned to him shortly thereafter. The purpose of such
arrangement was to escape their taxation in Ohio, and they
Notes
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were not returned for taxation either there or in New
York. Under these facts it is decided that under ordinary
laws, such as might be presumed to be in force, such notes
were not properly taxable in either of such states, but their
proper situs for taxation was in Indiana, where they were
permanently kept in the regular course of the owner's business, and that they were taxable by the proper officers of
the county where they were so kept.
TELEGRAMS.

The Supreme Court of Oregon holds in Frazier v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 78 Pac. 330, that the addressee
of a telegram can maintain an action for failure
Right of
Addressee to to deliver it only when the company has knowlAction
edge that it is for his benefit. Compare Playford
v. United Kingdom Tel. Co., L. R. 4, Q. B. 705, but see
2 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (5th ed.), Sec. 543.

WATER AND WATER-COURSES.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Beidler
v. Sanitary 'Dist. of Chicago, 71 N. E. 1118, that where
canals from a river were constructed for the
Riparlan
Rights
purpose of navigation, the owner of each lot
abutting thereon acquired by prescription the same riparian
rights in the water therein that he would have had if the
canals had been natural waterways. Compare City of
Reading v. Althome, 93 Pa. 400.

